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In Defense of Market Self-Regulation

AN ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY OF FUTURES
REGULATION AND THE TREND TOWARD
DEMUTUALIZATION
*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The debate over the efficacy of the U.S. system of
market self-regulation—where the securities and futures
industries regulate themselves with oversight from the federal
government—has been ongoing since its inception some
seventy years ago.1 Populist politicians have long compared the
system, primarily in times of regulatory failures or market
crises, to the proverbial fox guarding the henhouse. The
controversy surrounding recent market scandals has led to new
scrutiny of whether exchanges can properly police themselves.2
*

© 2005 Jake Keaveny. All Rights Reserved.
In 1963 the efficacy of the self-regulatory system was called into question
by stock market abuses reported in a Securities and Exchange Commission study, but
the SEC concluded that self-regulation should be maintained. Roberta S. Karmel,
Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and Implications of Demutualization of Stock and
Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 401 (2002) (citing SEC, REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKET, H.R. DOC. NO. 95, at 502, 83, 414-15 (1st Sess.
1963) [hereinafter SPECIAL STUDY]); see generally JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REGULATION (1987) [hereinafter HISTORY OF
COMMODITY FUTURES] (illustrating periodic strife between Congress and futures
industry since late 1800s regarding self-regulation). Between 1880 and 1920 there were
some 200 bills introduced in Congress to regulate futures and options trading. Id. at
10.
2
See, e.g., Laurie P. Cohen & Kate Kelly, NYSE Turmoil Poses Question:
Can Wall Street Regulate Itself?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2003, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB107282097396518500,00.html
(while
the
current system of self-regulation with government oversight has survived numerous
crisis, the scandal surrounding a $188 million pay package awarded to former New
York Stock Exchange Chairman Richard Grasso has forced Wall Street to confront
whether the system must be “drastically reformed or even replaced” in order to restore
the confidence of investors). Some suggest that a for-profit exchange will not vigorously
1
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The catalyzing events include a price-fixing investigation at the
Nasdaq in the late 1990s, an ongoing investigation of floor
trading at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),3 and
governance failures at the NYSE that resulted in the ousting of
former chairman Richard Grasso.4 Some have called for reforms
to overhaul the system, while others say it should be scrapped
altogether.5
The current debate over self-regulation was actually
well under way before these regulatory failures pushed it onto
the business pages. Industry and government officials have
been actively debating how self-regulation can be adapted to
address new conflicts of interest caused by a much more
secular change: the ongoing trend of demutualization, where
securities and futures exchanges convert to for-profit entities
from not-for-profits.6 The latest example is the NYSE’s
announced plan to demutualize as it acquires electronic trading
system Archipelago Holdings.7
This Note argues that the self-regulatory model, while
in need of some type of reform, will survive the latest round of
scrutiny because time has shown that it is the most efficient
and practical alternative. The debate over self-regulation must
be made in the context of the alternatives: the government as
the sole securities regulator or no government oversight at all.8
It is important to remember that direct governmental
regulation raises some of the same concerns that selfregulation does, as well as different concerns that are
particular to large government bureaucracies.9 The principal
undertake self-regulatory obligations if those obligations negatively affect profitability.
THOMAS ERICKSON, FUTURES EXCHANGE DEMUTUALIZATION 5 (2000) (internal
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) report by former CFTC
Commissioner Erickson) (on file at CFTC).
3
See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Big Changes at Exchanges Bring Their SelfRegulation Into Question, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2005 (At issue is whether selfregulation works . . . virtually every regional exchange has been cited for turning a
blind eye to improper or illegal behavior of one sort or another.)
4
Cohen & Kelly, supra note 2.
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., SEC. INDUS. ASSOC., REINVENTING SELF-REGULATION, WHITE
PAPER FOR THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION 8-9 (2000, updated 2003), available
at http://www.sia.com/testimony/html/white_paper1.html [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]
(outlining the advantages and disadvantages of the current regulatory regime as part
of a study into whether an alternative model should be employed).
7
See, e.g., Andre Postelnicu et al., NYSE to Merge with Archipelago
Exchange, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2005.
8
See, e.g., Sam Scott Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A
Critical Examination, 42 WASH. & LEE L.REV. 861 (1985).
9
See, e.g., Raymond Urban & Richard Menckel, Federal Regulation of
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advantages for self-regulation as an adjunct to government
oversight are to minimize intrusion into the marketplace, take
advantage of the expertise of professionals working within the
exchanges, and defray the costs of monitoring and policing
trading practices to the private sector.10
The self-regulatory model has been in continuous
evolution since it was created under the Commodity Exchange
Act in 1936, first operating under the oversight of the
Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA), and later the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission.11 In the case of the
securities industry, modern self-regulation began under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, when the Securities and
Exchange Commission was created. For decades the
government sought to increase its authority over exchanges,
focusing on rooting out fraud and bolstering the financial
strength of market participants.12 With regards to the futures
industry, in recent years the government has changed tacks by
relaxing the regulatory framework and giving self-regulatory
organizations more authority, not less, as a means to improve
efficiency.13
Whiskey Labeling: From the Repeal of Prohibition to the Present, 15 J. LAW & ECON.
411 (1972); William A. Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the
Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J. L. & ECON. 151 (1972), as cited in Miller, supra
note 8, at 861. Miller argues that in some cases no regulation at all (other than that
provided by privately enforced rights) might be a preferable alternative. Id. New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer said that the Securities and Exchange Commission has
become too close with the securities industry, as evidenced by its early rejection of
efforts to force Wall Street banks to reform the way they provide stock research.
Interview by Reuters News with Eliot Spitzer, New York State Attorney General, New
York, NY (Nov. 12, 2003). Spitzer went on to say that the SEC is slow to uncover
abuses, is too soft on violators, and is too slow in crafting new rules that address
abuses. Id. Throughout history, no single government authority has ever been
entrusted with regulatory authority over all American banks. See Jerry W. Markham,
Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 319, 405
n.435 (2003) (citing BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON
REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 8 (1984)).
10
See WHITE PAPER, supra note 6.
11
See generally HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1.
12
Id.
13
See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Research, Nutrition and General
Legislature, Subcomm. on Agric., Nutrition and Forestry, 107th Cong. 2 (2000)
(statement by C. Robert Paul, General Counsel, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, detailing the content and purpose of the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000, at the time it was being proposed to Congress).
[T]he proposed RFE [(Recognized Futures Exchange)] offers significant
regulatory relief compared to the current requirements applicable to
designated contract markets. . . . The second category, the derivatives
transaction facility [DTF], would be subject to a lesser degree of Commission
oversight. . . . Finally, the third category, the exempt multilateral transaction
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It is natural that self-regulatory bodies be forced to
undergo further reforms as new governance concerns arise. A
current concern is the creation of new potential conflicts of
interest that stem from the transformation into for-profit
entities.14 But this paper also argues that the underlying forces
fueling the move to demutualize—for instance, the advent of
electronic exchanges, internationalization of markets and
increased competition both domestically and abroad—will
create new incentives for exchanges to better police themselves
by increasing more competition among exchanges.
This analysis will begin by looking at the historic
evolution of self-regulation in the U.S. futures industry,15
including how power has shifted back and forth between the
federal government and the exchanges. The Note then reviews
how different exchanges have reacted to recent allegations of
conflicts of interest and failures in corporate governance, and
finally, it reviews the most widely considered options being
proposed to change the system.16
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF SELF-REGULATION

A.

Prior to the Commodities Exchange Act of 1936

the

Organized futures trading dates back to the founding of
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1848, where

execution facility [MTEF], or exempt MTEF, would operate on an
unregulated basis.
Id. at 3.
14
See WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 1.
15
The regulatory regimes of both futures and securities exchanges are
similar. This Note addresses issues relevant to both, though unless otherwise noted, it
will focus on futures exchanges. The regulation of futures trading is less politicized
than that of securities—at least by some measures—because futures and other
derivatives contracts are mainly traded by large financial institutions and other
sophisticated investors. By contrast, the shares in publicly held companies traded on
securities exchange are to a large degree held, both directly and indirectly, by retail
investors and pensioners. As a result, the tendency of elected officials to pressure for
stricter regulation in the securities industry is more tightly linked to the ups and
downs of the market than it is for the futures industry (though regulation of the
futures is certainly not immune from political lobbying by market participants). See
generally Markham, supra note 9, at 399-403 (describing the hysteria within Congress
and by various regulatory offices to quickly react to scandals surrounding publicly
traded companies like energy trader Enron Corp. and investment bank Merrill Lynch
& Co.)
16
Demutualization is the process of reorganizing a mutualized, or member
owned, entity into a for-profit corporation with shareholders. Organized securities and
futures exchanges where traditionally operated as non-profit membership
organizations, but advances in technology, increased competition and other market
forces have led numerous exchanges to demutualize. Karmel, supra note 1, at 368-69.

4/9/2005 6:07:50 PM

2005]

IN DEFENSE OF MARKET SELF-REGULATION

1423

commodities ranging from grain to coal to alcohol were traded.17
At the outset, U.S. futures exchanges regulated themselves,
with some oversight from state regulators, though none from
the federal government.18 The main incentive for self-regulation
was to assure high standards of conduct and decorum on the
trading floor.19 It became clear early on that a more rigid form
of government oversight would be needed.20
As trading volumes on futures exchanges grew during
the late 19th century, there developed a steady flow of
allegations that the market was vulnerable to manipulation.21
The failures of the system became apparent in the 1880s with
the rise of so-called bucket shops, which were poorly financed,
off-exchange establishments where speculators bet on
commodities prices.22 Many banks would not lend money to
brokerages that were not members of the most prominent
exchanges, so smaller brokerages would often “bucket” their
clients’ money in order to get capital with which to trade.23 By
1891, the practice had become so prevalent that one member of
the CBOT, one of the most respected commodities exchanges,
wrote a pamphlet actually defending bucket shops.24 The
Consolidated Exchange, a securities exchange which at the
time was a powerful rival to the New York Stock Exchange,
17

See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 4.
Id.
19
See id. (citing JONATHAN LURIE, THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, 18591905, at 25 (1979)).
20
See id. at 10.
21
Id. at 4.
22
THOMAS HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 88 (1971).
23
ROBERT SOBEL, THE CURBSTONE BROKERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
STOCK EXCHANGE 69 (1970).
24
H. S. Irwin, Legal Status of Trading in Futures, 32 ILL. L. REV. 155, 155
n.5 (1938). Bucket shops accepted customers’ orders and funds but did not execute the
orders on any exchange. Rather, they simply bet the customer would lose and kept the
customer’s money when they did. If the customer won too much, the bucket shop would
simply fold its operations and move to a new location. Comparative Analysis, supra
note 15, at 339 n.92 (citing JOHN HILL, JR., GOLD BRICKS OF SPECULATION 37-39
(1904)).
The term “bucketshop” as now applied in the United States, was first used in
the late [18]70’s, but it is very evident that it was coined in London as many
as 50 years ago, when it had absolutely no reference to any species of
speculation or gambling. It appears that beer swillers from the East Side
(London) went from street to street with a bucket, draining every keg they
came across and picking up cast off cigar butts. Arriving at a den, they
gathered for social amusement around a table and passed the bucket as a
loving cup . . . the den soon became called a bucket shop. Later on the term
was applied, both in England and the United States, as a byword for
reproach, to small places where grain and stock deals were counterfeited.
Id.
18
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came to be regarded as a “den of bucketeers.” The Chicago
Open Board of Trade, or the “Little Board,” was said to be
captured by bucketeers (The Chicago Open Board of Trade
later became the Mid-America Commodity Exchange, which
eventually joined with the CBOT in 1985).25
As the bucket shops became more influential, the
exchanges found themselves in a conflicted position with state
regulators. Those that were losing business began to push for
more assistance from state regulators, but at the same time,
the exchanges tried to defend their right to regulate themselves
against mounting criticism that futures trading had become
corrupted. Some of the more prominent exchanges tried to put
the bucket shops out of business by cutting off access to market
quotations.26 In a major victory, the CBOT established the legal
right to prevent bucket shops from obtaining market
quotations in the 1904 case, Chicago Board of Trade v. Christie
Grain & Stock Co.27 The CBOT used undercover detectives and
eventually prosecuted a number of its members for engaging in
bucket shop activities.28 Expulsions resulted, with 281 people in
Illinois indicted for violating the state’s anti-bucket shop laws.29
Political pressures to create federal oversight of the
exchanges mounted, but the industry still had some powerful
supporters. President Herbert Hoover was quoted as saying
that the CBOT is “the most economical and efficient agency of
the marketing of foodstuffs anywhere in the world.”30 Other
politicians stated that it would be a mistake to supplant a
system that is dictated by the market with an inefficient
government bureaucracy.31
25

M. Van Smith, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the
Return of the Bucketeers: A Lesson in Regulatory Failure, 57 N.D. L. REV. 7, 13 (1981).
26
See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 9.
27
Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 253
(1905) (upholding an injunction which cut off quotations to the operations of C.C.
Christie). “[T]he plaintiff’s collection of quotations is entitled to the protection of law. It
stands like a trade secret . . . that others might do similar work, if they might, does not
authorize them to steal the plaintiff’s.” Id. at 250.
28
See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 10.
29
See id.
30
Hearing on Futures Trading Before the House Comm. on Agric., 66th
Cong., 583 (1921).
31
Id. at 125. Representative Thaddeus Caraway:
I have never believed that someone who sits here in the basement of some
Government building with his hair parted in the middle can run this country
better than all the people can run their own private business. I have no
patience with that. I never went to a department in my life I did not come
away thoroughly angry and half ashamed of my government . . . .
Id.
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The problems with bucket shops continued, however,
giving way to a series of congressional investigations and
unsuccessful bills that sought to either put heavy regulations
on futures trading, or prohibit it altogether.32 The industry
drew on the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Trade v.
Christie to defend against accusations that futures trading was
similar to gambling, a charge that was grounded in a general
failure to understand how trading activity could be legitimate
when the majority of commodities contracts were never
actually delivered.33 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes validated
the concept of futures trading in Board of Trade v. Christie.34
Using the CBOT’s grain pit as an example, he acknowledged
that in three-fourths of the transactions no grain actually
exchanged hands.35 Still, Holmes determined that the sales
were settled legitimately, proclaiming that the fact that
contracts were satisfied in this way detracts in no way from the
good faith of the parties and is consistent with a serious
business purpose.36
In 1921, Congress approved the Futures Trading Act
(FTA), the first legislation to create federal oversight of futures
trading.37 But the FTA was quickly struck down. In Hill v.
Wallace, the Supreme Court ruled that the Act was an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s taxation authority.38
The Act had sought to give the Secretary of Agriculture
authority over exchanges by giving it the power to designate
exchanges as “contract markets.”39 Options and grain futures
contracts not traded on government approved exchanges were
to be subject to a prohibitive 20-cent per bushel tax.40
32

See id.
See id.
34
See Christie, 198 U.S. at 247-48.
Speculation of this kind by competent men is the self-adjustment of society to
the probable. Its value is well known as a means of avoiding or mitigating
catastrophes, equalizing prices and providing for periods of want. It is true
that the success of the strong induces imitation by the weak, and that
incompetent persons bring themselves to ruin by undertaking to speculate in
their turn. But legislatures and courts generally have recognized that the
natural evolutions of a complex society are to be touched only with a very
cautious hand, and that such course attempts at a remedy for the waste
incident . . . are harmful and vain.
33

Id.
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 246-47.
Id. at 251.
Futures Trading Act, Aug. 24, 1921 c. 86, 42 Stat. 187.
Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
Id. at 63-64
Id. “To give such magic to the word ‘tax’ would be to break down all
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The ruling in Hill helps to illustrate the complex nature
of the relationship between futures exchanges and the
government at a time when it was clear that federal
intervention had become inevitable. While members of the
futures industry were widely opposed to government oversight,
representatives of the CBOT itself were not the ones to
challenge the constitutionality of the FTA. A number of
members of the CBOT brought the suit, and charged that the
exchange’s board of directors refused to challenge the statute
itself because it did not want to offend the Secretary of
Agriculture.41 In his opinion, Justice William Howard Taft
concluded that in not challenging the FTA itself the CBOT’s
board of directors had failed in their duty to represent the
interests of its members.42
However, just a few days after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hill there was a manipulation of grain prices, which
reinforced the belief within Congress that regulation was
needed immediately.43 Legislatures quickly passed the Grain
Futures Act of 1922,44 this time resting authority on its
commerce powers rather than taxation powers. The Supreme
Court subsequently upheld the Grain Futures Act based on
Congress’s contention that market volatility on the exchanges
was a burden on interstate commerce.45 Section 5 of the act
permitted the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate futures
trading by requiring that such transactions be conducted on a
“contract” market that must be licensed by the federal
government.46 That provision still forms the core of the current
regulatory system today. It also required that the exchanges
prevent such conduct as price manipulation,47 marking the
onset of the exchanges’ role as self-regulator under oversight of
the federal government.
constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the
sovereignty of the states.” Id. at 68.
41
Id. at 61, 72. “The averments of the bill are that the Board of Directors
refused the request to bring suit because they feared to antagonize the public officials
whose duty it was to construe and enforce the act, and not because they thought the act
was unconstitutional.” Id. at 61
42
Id. at 61. In a concurring opinion, Justice Louis Brandeis asserted that the
Chicago Board of Trade should not be required to contest every statute that its
members believe to be invalid. Id. at 74.
43
Markham, supra note 9, at 338 (citing H.R. REP.NO. 67-1095, at 2 (1922)).
44
Commodity Exchange Act (Grain Futures Act), ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (2000)).
45
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 56 (1923).
46
7 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
47
Id. at § 5(b).
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The Grain Futures Administration (GFA), the Secretary
of Agriculture office that carried out the Act, had the role of
investigating practices at the exchanges, while actual
regulation of trading was conducted by the exchanges.48 The
arrangement had mixed results, with the government in its
new role often just as responsible for regulation failures as the
exchanges were. For instance, in an effort to boost surveillance
the GFA required the clearing members of each exchange to
provide daily reports that included the market positions of its
customers.49 But while members of the CBOT were willing to
make their records available, the GFA had only one internal
auditor and was therefore unable to monitor the records in a
meaningful way.50 The GFA suspected fraud and market
speculation in many of the cases it reviewed, but it had limited
success in prosecuting the cases. It also began to supervise the
dissemination of news reports, an effort to stop
unsubstantiated reports that were moving the market.51
A series of trading scandals and the onset of the Great
Depression led to a further loss of faith in the exchanges’
ability to regulate themselves.52 On the political front, a
populist movement against futures trading began to gather
steam.53 One Senator in favor of heavier government oversight
called the CBOT the “world’s greatest gambling house.”54
B.

The Commodities Exchange Act

In 1936, Congress approved the Commodity Exchange
Act, the result of efforts by President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
who had pushed for new regulation of both the securities and

48

HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 15.
Id.
50
Id.
In 1927, however, the Grain Futures Administration suspended its
requirements of daily reports for large traders, because of continuing charges
that its reports were keeping large bullish speculators from operating in the
wheat market and thereby depressing prices. It suspended reporting
requirements from February 26, 1927, until November 1, 1927. It then
determined that its reports did not have the effect of discouraging bullish
spectators.
49

Id.
51

Agricultural Appropriations Bill, Hearings Before a House Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Appropriations, 69th Cong., 727 (1926).
52
See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 22-24.
53
See id. at 26-27.
54
U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., August
9, 1921, p. 4763 (Sen. Arthur Capper, Republican, Kansas).
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futures industries.55 Regulation of the two industries was
separated because the banking committees controlled securities
matters and the agriculture committees controlled commodity
exchanges, and neither was willing to cede power.56 The CEA
was created to replace the Grain Futures Act as the authority
over day-to-day regulation.57 Drafters of the Act included
statutes that prohibited market price manipulation,58 created
“position limits” in a bid to curtail the taking of big speculative
positions,59 and established registration requirements for
futures brokers, known as futures commission merchants
(FCMs).60 The Act also initiated the financial requirement that
customers place margins in trust with the FCMs.61
The success of the regulatory effort continued to be
mixed. The CEA began to regularly audit the FCMs, and found
that oftentimes their clients’ investments were not being
properly protected.62 At dozens of firms it was found that the
positions held by clients did not match the funds that FCMs
held in segregated accounts (where the accounts of each client
was segregated from other FCM accounts).63 In one
investigation the CEA looked at approximately 4500
discretionary accounts by financial advisors, finding that many
were not properly executing their clients’ trades on time or
were leaving unprofitable trades open so that clients would
have a false impression of the value of their trading portfolios.64
Even though the members of the futures exchanges had
resisted passage of the Act, there is evidence they played an
important role in furthering the government’s regulatory
efforts once it was passed. For example, in August 1938 the
heads of the leading commodity exchanges were asked to meet
in Washington to consider what rules were needed to meet the
discretionary account problems uncovered by the CEA.65
Thereafter, every contract market represented at the

55

See Markham, supra note 9, at 339-40.
Id.
57
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, ch. 545. 49 Stat. 1491 [hereinafter
Commodity Exchange Act] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
58
Commodity Exchange Act § 4(c), 6(b).
59
Commodity Exchange Act § 4(a).
60
Commodity Exchange Act § 4d(1).
61
Commodity Exchange Act § 4d(2).
62
See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 30.
63
See id.
64
See id. at 31.
65
Id.
56

4/9/2005 6:07:50 PM

2005]

IN DEFENSE OF MARKET SELF-REGULATION

1429

conference adopted amendments to their rules to prevent such
practices.66
In one of the better examples of futures exchanges
making an earnest effort to police themselves, the CBOT
pursued one of the country’s biggest and most powerful grain
traders, Cargill Grain Co., for alleged manipulation of the
market.67 In 1939 the CBOT required Cargill to liquidate part
of a large position in 1937 September corn futures, and later
expelled the company from membership on the exchange.68
Cargill fought the expulsion with the Commodity Exchange
Commission, an overseeing body made up of representatives
from the Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Attorney General
and the Department of Commerce, on the basis that the board
of trade had acted outside of its authority as defined in the
Commodity Exchange Act.69 In 1940, the CEA dismissed the
action, finding that the CBOT had sufficient reason to believe
that Cargill’s was attempting to manipulate the market.70
The CBOT’s actions led the Secretary of Agriculture to
conduct its own probes of Cargill’s trading,71 which would lead
to a series of charges against Cargill over the next several
decades. In 1940 the Secretary of Agriculture brought charges
against Cargill for engaging in “wash trades”72 and
manipulating the price of corn, and issued a temporary ban on
its trading privileges.73 Cargill was charged with manipulating
66

Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE
ADMINISTRATION 39 (Sept. 25, 1939). At one time the Cargill Grain Co. held 80% of the
total long open contracts. Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE
ADMINISTRATION 44 (Aug. 31, 1940).
71
Id. at 44-45.
72
Wash trading, as defined by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
is “entering into, or purporting to enter to, transactions to give the appearance that
purchases and sales have been made, without incurring market risk or changing the
trader’s market position.” Wash trading involving futures contracts is prohibited by the
Commodity Exchange Act, available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/glossary/opaglossary_
wxyz.htm. Wash trades are pre-arranged simultaneous trades entered into for the
purpose of artificially inflating volumes or revenues or for the purpose of manipulating
prices. C. Bryson Hull, Suit Says El Paso Engaged in Wash Trades, REUTERS BUS.
NEWS, Nov. 21, 2002.
73
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE
ADMINISTRATION 44-45 (Aug. 31, 1940).
[T]he respondents entered into a stipulation with the complainant, admitting
that one of the respondents, J.H. MacMillan, Jr., president of Cargill, Inc.,
directed and was responsible for the trading of the Cargill Grain Co. of
Illinois, which executed transactions in grain futures as alleged in the
67
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prices of oats futures in 1951 and 1952, and banned from
trading in oats futures contracts.74 In 1971 a federal appeals
court upheld a ruling that Cargill had manipulated wheat
contracts on the CBOT eight years earlier, at one point holding
62% of the long interest in all contracts to be delivered in May
of 1963.75
Still, despite a few notable instances, such as the Cargill
case, there was evidence that self-regulators were not
effectively policing exchange floors. The CEA conducted
infrequent investigations of trading floor practices, and one
investigation showed that an estimated 10% of the trading
volume came from wash trades (profitless round trades that
can be used to inflate trading volume or falsely inflate
revenues).76 In another instance, regulators conducted a probe
in 1968 into job lot trading (splitting commodities trades into
denominations of less than 5,000 bushels) on the CBOT.77 The
investigation showed a lack of competition in trade execution,
and as a result customers were paying a higher premium on
their purchases and were being forced to sell at a greater
discount. Following the investigation job lot trading on the
CBOT was discontinued and complaints were issued against
seven floor traders.78 Such discoveries put pressure on the CEA
to perform more investigations, despite operating with limited
resources.79
Even so, these investigations did not substantiate one of
the government’s biggest concerns, that floor traders on the
exchanges exercised their special advantages to profit at the
expense of the trading public. In 1968 the General Accounting
Office (GAO) released a study stating that floor traders had
such advantages.80 In response, the Commodity Exchange
complaint, and that the other individual respondents acted on instructions
from MacMillan.
Id.
74

See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 32.
Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (8th Cir. 1971).
The Government’s theory of this case is that Cargill manipulated the price . .
. by means of a device known as a “little corner” or “squeeze.” . . . Squeeze
(congestion): These are terms used to designate a condition in maturing
futures where sellers (hedgers or speculators), having waited too long to close
their trades, find there are no new sellers from who they can buy . . . .
75

Id.
76
77
78
79
80

HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 51.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Administration (CEA) conducted a test study of potato futures
contracts traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange
(NYMEX). It found that day trading by floor traders
represented only a small, relatively stable percentage of
trading, and that short-term intra-day price movements
resulted principally from trading by the general public, not
trading by floor traders.81 It also found that two times as often
as not, floor traders were trading against price movements,
which indicated to the CEA that day traders actually helped to
limit volatile price movements.82
Congress approved amendments to the Commodity
Exchange Act in 1968 to step up the CEA’s regulatory
authority.83 The Agriculture Department was a driving force
behind implementation of the changes, which helps to show an
animosity that had developed between the government and the
futures industry.84 The CEA’s power was broadened to include
the establishment of minimum financial requirements for
FCMs,85 livestock and concentrated orange juice futures
contracts were brought under its jurisdiction,86 and criminal
penalties (from misdemeanor to felony) for market violations
were made more severe.87 However, one major amendment also
had an unintended effect of weakening self-regulation. The
CEA was given the power to disapprove rules implemented at
the exchanges.88 This government involvement led courts to
begin to view the exchanges’ rules as carrying a guarantee that
members of the exchanges would not violate them.89 As a result,
the amendments had the unintended effect of weakening selfregulation because exchanges began to reduce their regulatory
schemes in order to minimize the potential liability from
private litigation.90

81

HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 51.
Id.
83
1968 Amendments to CEA, Pub. L. No. 90-258, 82 Stat. 30.
84
HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 52.
85
Commodity Exchange Act Sec. 4d.
86
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE COMMODITY
EXCHANGE ACT: ISSUES RELATED TO THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION’S
REAUTHORIZATION 55 (May 1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg990
74.pdf.
87
7 U.S.C. § 9(a) (2000).
88
7 U.S.C. § 8a(7) (2000).
89
See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 62.
90
See id.
82
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The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974

By the early 1970s there was a growing consensus that
futures markets were as important to the general public as
securities markets were.
A series of market manipulation scandals and a sharp
increase in trading volumes for both regulated and nonregulated commodities led to criticism that the CEA was not
properly protecting small traders and the consuming public.91
At the time, the country was in the midst of the Cold War, and
there was concern within Congress that the futures markets
were susceptible to manipulation by companies from the USSR
and other foreign nations.92 There was sentiment within
Congress that regulation within the exchanges was lax, but of
equal concern was that the CEA was not properly overseeing
the exchanges.93 An internal report prepared for the inspector
general of the Department of Agriculture found that the CEA
relied on the exchanges too heavily to enforce its rules, and
that self-regulation was insufficient.94 In 1973 a damaging
article in the Des Moines Register stated that the CEA had
turned the task of regulation over to the exchanges, and that
the exchanges were run in a “club like atmosphere.”95
Congress concluded it needed to establish a regulatory
authority similar to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
which was created by the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act.96
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act (CFTCA) of
1974 dramatically increased the government’s authority over
futures exchanges.97 The most important provision of the Act
91

See id. at 56-57.
“In the early 1970s, Congress became concerned about the ‘Great Grain
Robbery,’ that the Soviets were using the commodity futures markets as a means to
manipulate prices and obtain large profits at the expense of American consumers.” Id.
at 56. “The ‘Grain Robbery’ of 1972 was one of those economic events that, like the
OPEC oil embargo . . . can truly be said to have changed the world.” Id. at 262 n.10
(quoting DAN MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN 120-21 (1979)).
93
H.R. REP. No. 93-975, at 46-47 (1974).
94
CEA relied on exchanges to enforce their rules and to insure that all trades
were executed “competitively. Insufficient effort was made to determine whether
trading rules were enforced. . . . [W]e also found other suspected violations of trading
rules which we believe indicate a lack of control, detection and enforcement of rules
governing the execution of customer orders.” Id.
95
Clark Mollenhoff, Probe CEA False Reports—Gross Fraud Alleged, THE
DES MOINES REG., Oct. 1, 1973.
96
Markham, supra note 9, at 341.
97
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463,
88 Stat. 1389 [hereinafter CFTC Act] (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
92

4/9/2005 6:07:50 PM

2005]

IN DEFENSE OF MARKET SELF-REGULATION

1433

was the creation of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), an independent five-member regulatory
commission.98 The agency was given exclusive jurisdiction over
the trading of futures and options on all commodities.99 Just as
in the securities industry, exchanges would continue to
regulate themselves, though the CFTC would be overseer with
broader authority and more resources.100
But while the debate leading up to the CFTCA focused
on how to increase the government’s authority, the reality of
attaining that goal forced legislatures to concentrate on what is
still a major consideration today: cost and efficiency. The result
was actually to increase the responsibility of the exchanges,
though under broader and stricter guidelines so that the
government could be a more efficient overseer.101 In a hearing
before the Senate’s Committee on Agriculture and Forestry in
May of 1974, Senator George McGovern from South Dakota
argued that registered exchanges should be performing many
of the routine checks and investigations that the government
was currently responsible for, while the federal regulatory arm
should have a heavier hand in making sure the exchanges
enforce the government’s rules.102 In one example of inefficiency,
McGovern said that the CEA’s professional staff spent about
25% of its time performing routine audits of the hundreds of
FCMs. It made more sense to place the primary responsibility
for those audits with the exchanges themselves.103 The size of
the CEA’s staff, he pointed out, remained at 165 between 1970
and 1973, even though the volume of derivatives contracts
traded had surged by 73% during the same period.104 By
McGovern’s estimation, the growth in the market was fast
outpacing the CEA’s resources.
98

CFTC Act § 201.
Id.
100
The CFTC was given increased enforcement powers, the regulatory reach
of the Commodity Exchange Act was expanded to include commodity trading advisors,
commodity pool operators, and associated persons of futures commission merchants.
Markham, supra note 9, at 341.
101
See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Agric. and Forestry, 93d Cong. 199200 (1974).
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 199. In another example, McGovern said the exchanges should be
responsible for regularly reviewing the need for position limits on specific commodities
in order to head off attempts to manipulate the market; be given a time limit for
implementing and enforcing trading rules; and conduct investigations to seek out
abusive practices. As futures trading escalated, the CEA simply could not handle these
sorts of responsibilities. Id.
99

4/9/2005 6:07:50 PM

1434

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:4

Exchange members who had opposed increased
government authority over rulemaking argued that the 1974
Act would destroy the exchanges’ free market traits. In the
same senate committee hearing, Carlos Bradley, President of
the Board of Trade of Kansas City, Mo., said that “the effect of
such a proposal could be to abdicate completely to the
government the responsibility of the exchanges, the expertise
of their members, their public responsibility etc. There would
be no need for exchange governments.”105 Those arguments,
however, were generally lost in Congress, where there
remained strong support to increase government oversight.
Under the CFTCA, the CFTC’s authority was expanded
from the statutory list of physical commodities to include
futures contracts on all goods, articles, services and rights and
interests—thereby defining the term commodity to include
anything on which a contract is traded (except onions).106 The
CFTC was given power to grant reparations to any person hurt
by a violation of the Act,107 and commodity trading advisers,
commodity pool operators (enterprises who solicited and
received funds from others in order to trade in commodity
futures) and associated persons (employees of FCMs who
solicited or accepted customer orders or supervised such
persons) were now required to be registered with the agency.108
Also, the CFTC now had a direct involvement in the
regulation by the exchanges. Exchanges were required to
submit proposals for new rules pertaining to futures contracts
or trading requirements to the CFTC for advance approval.109
The CFTC was given long desired authority to intervene in the
trading of contract exchanges when it deemed market
disturbances to be emergencies.110 It was also given injunctive
authority, a power that the Department of Agriculture had
sought for years.111 The CFTCA increased the potential
105

Id. at 225.
CFTC Act § 201 (1974). Onion farmers successfully lobbied to have onions
withheld from futures trading after onion futures disastrously plummeted in 1955. The
lobbying effort resulted in the so-called Onion Futures Act, passed by Congress in 1958.
David S. Jacks, Populists v. Theorists: Futures Markets and the Volatility of Prices, at
14, at http://aghistory.ucdavis.edu/jackspaper04.pdf. Onions are the only commodity to
be banned from futures trading. Id. The law was upheld as constitutional in 1959. Id.
Subsequent studies have shown that onion prices have were volatile when futures
trading was permitted than after the law was passed. Id.
107
CFTC Act § 209.
108
Id. at § 4k.
109
Id. at § 210.
110
Id. at § 215.
111
Id. at §6c.
106
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penalties for market manipulation to $100,000 from $10,000,112
and provided the framework for the creation of a quasi-public
regulator that would, similar to the National Association of
Securities Dealers in the securities market, govern the conduct
of market participants who are not members of contracts
markets.113
The CFTCA encouraged exchanges to enforce its rules
under the CFTC’s oversight by explicitly authorizing them to
discipline their members.114 The exchanges were required to
report any such actions to the CFTC, which could in turn
affirm, modify them or set the disciplinary actions aside.115
Two years later, in 1976, the CFTC commenced one of
its most significant regulatory reforms. The liquidity
requirements of FCMs were increased in a move designed to
ensure that their financial position could not deteriorate to the
point of endangering customer funds.116 The requirement, while
imposing substantial costs on the system, was designed to
insure the financial integrity of the system.117 To defray the cost
of the audits from the government, the CFTC required FCMs to
be audited by independent financial accountants.118 Other
provisions were included in the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 to
further protect owners of the futures contracts from financial
failure of a FCM.119 The capital requirements would set in
motion an important trend of consolidating trading into the
hands of the most financially sound FCMs, which in turn would
allow both government and self-regulators to focus on issues
like trading violations and market manipulation.
112

CFTC Act § 6B.
Id. at §17.
114
Id. at § 8C.
115
Id.
116
See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 86. For amended
statute see 7 U.S.C.A. § 6f(b) (2002).
117
See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 87. The
certification requirement, coupled with early warning requirements, is also designed to
ensure that the CFTC is on early notice when a firm is in financial trouble, so steps can
be undertaken to prevent or limit injury to customers. Id.
118
Id. at 86.
119
Id. at 87.
The primary protection for investors in commodity futures contracts is that
their funds are kept in segregated trust accounts. It often happens, however,
that a breach of such trust may occur—the broker could convert the funds,
either to trade for its own account or to meet the margin calls of another
customer. In such instances, the new Bankruptcy Code provisions provide for
the equal sharing of all customers in any remaining segregated funds. . . .
[T]hese customers have a priority over all other creditors in such funds.
Id.
113
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In the ensuing years, regulation of futures exchanges
was subject to harsh criticisms, but oftentimes it was directed
at failures of the CFTC rather than at the exchanges. In
addition to criticism of the CFTC’s handling of a series of
options scandals in the late 1970s,120 a report prepared for
Congressman James Whitten of Mississippi by the Surveys and
Investigations Staff of the House Committee on Appropriations
showed that the CFTC was in many respects incompetent.121
The report found that the CFTC employed a disproportionately
large number of political appointees and that there had been a
flagrant misuse of funds, ranging from the use of outside
consultants in order to avoid civil service hiring restrictions, to
overpayment for parking spaces and driving services for CFTC
employees.122 Abuses were also found in the awarding of
government contracts. For example, one former employee in
the chairman’s office was given two consulting contracts, which
if aggregated, would have exceeded a threshold amount that
would have triggered a requirement to open the contract up to
a competitive bidding process.123
D.

The Commodity Futures Modernization Act

After six decades of strengthening its oversight,
government regulators began to contemplate changing tacks in
the late 1990s. The CFTC had determined that the financial
underpinnings of the futures industry had been strengthened
enough that it would now be more efficient to loosen its grip on
Trading
volumes
had
surged
and
self-regulators.124
technological advances were giving way to growth of electronic

120

Id. at 94-96. (detailing in particular the attempt by brothers Bunker and
Herbert Hunt of Dallas, Texas to corner the soybean market in 1977, at times owning
the right to take delivery of over one-third of the U.S. carryover inventory for old crop
soybeans covered by the Chicago Board of Trade contracts).
121
HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 95th Cong., INVESTIGATIVE STUDY ON
THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM. (Comm. Print 1978) (by Mr. Whitten for use
by the Subcomm. on Agric., Rural Development and Related Agencies).
122
See id. at 51, 64-66, 72. “While the schism between the former CEA
employees and the newly hired CFTC group may have contributed to some of the early
organizational problems of the Commission, the [Subcommittee’s] Investigative Staff
was advised that of even greater significance was the rivalries between the new seniorlevel staff appointees.” Id. at 23.
123
Id. at 64.
124
See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Research, Nutrition and General
Legislation, Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 107th Cong. 2-3
(2000) (statement of C. Robert Paul, General Counsel of Commodity Futures Trading
Commission).
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exchanges that could operate across borders.125 The industry
argued that the current regulatory system had bogged it down
to the point that it may not be able to compete effectively with
foreign exchanges. Under heavy pressure from the industry,126
the CFTC approved a series of amendments called the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000.127 The aim of
the CFMA was to make the regulatory framework more
flexible. Exchanges were now allowed to create a regulatory
framework from sets of “core principles” that fit their
particular operation, rather than have to adhere to a one size
fits all system.128 The framework also created three regulatory
tiers for markets, with a lower level of regulatory oversight
where access to the exchange or trading facility is limited to
commercial participants and the nature of the underlying
commodities provides a low risk of manipulation.129
Unlike the fiery debates that preceded prior regulatory
legislation, there appeared to be little contention between the
industry and government regarding the CFMA. In a March,
2000 hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Research,
Nutrition and General Legislation, of the Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, Senator Peter Fitzgerald,
the chairman, opened by saying that “the CFTC has suggested
that it is willing to grant broad regulatory relief to futures
exchanges.”130 C. Robert Paul, General Counsel of the CFTC,
followed by saying that one of the CFTC’s main policy goals
should be “removing any regulatory barriers that hamper these
markets from fully exploiting innovations in technology.”131
The major futures exchanges chimed in. David Brennan,
chairman of the CBOT, told the subcommittee that it “heartily
endorses the concept of replacing inflexible, micromanageing
125

See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on General Farm Commodities and
Risk of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 108th Cong. 16 (2003) (statement of James
Newsome, Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, in response to
question by the subcommittee).
126
Id. Committee member and Representative from Kansas Jerry Moran said
in a review of the CFMA two years after it was approved: “[W]e heard continually from
the exchanges about the potential threat if we didn’t appropriately deregulate the
industry, the threat from competition, foreign sources, from the ability of customers to
utilize exchange service offshore.” Id.
127
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (2000) (amendments in scattered sections throughout 7 U.S.C.).
128
7 U.S.C. § 7(d) (2000).
129
Id.
130
Hearing Before S. Subcomm. on Research, Nutrition and General Legis.,
supra note 124, at 1.
131
Id. at 2.
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[sic], government mandates with core principles. The CFTC is
right that exchanges and others are best able to design systems
to achieve the desired and shared objectives of market
integrity, financial integrity and preventing abuses.”132
At a hearing to discuss the CFMA two and a half years
after it was approved, congressional members seemed unable to
assess whether the new system had been an improvement or
not. The CFTC defended the CFMA by saying trade volume in
futures has increased by 50% since its passage, and that as it
had predicted, the industry has become substantially more
competitive.133
But in the interim there had also been a series of
market scandals, including the collapse of a major energy
trader, Enron Corp., and several congressmen raised concerns
about whether the CFTC was properly able to monitor the
energy markets.134 CFTC Chairman James Newsome also
conceded that foreign exchanges had not followed suit with
similar moves to liberalize their regulatory regimes.135
III.

DEMUTUALIZATION AND MODERN TRENDS

A.

Trend of For-Profit Exchanges

The trend by the world’s largest exchanges to
demutualize has pushed the debate about self-regulation back
to the forefront.136 Demutualization in this context refers to the
conversion of non-profit, membership-owned organizations into
for-profit stock corporations. Demutualization among futures
and securities exchanges has been driven by forces in the
business environment, including advances in technology,
globalization of markets, a concentration of investment capital,
competitive pricing pressure and government deregulation.137
132

Id. at 64.
Hearing Before House Subcomm. on General Farm Commodities, supra
note 125, at 16 (statement by James Newsome, Chairman of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission). Newsome said that during the prior one and a half years, the
CFTC, which usually handles about 100 investigations concurrently, had conducted
roughly 30 investigations in the energy sector. Id. at 27.
134
Id. at 22.
135
Id. at 16-17.
136
See generally Karmel, supra note 1.
137
Id. at 368.
A dramatic shift in the economic and power structure of the securities
industry is currently in progress. Although competition to traditional
markets from electronic trading markets may be the precipitating cause of
this upheaval, more than technology is driving these changes. The worldwide
133
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By demutualizing, management at the exchanges hope to be
able to raise larger pools of money, which in turn would allow
them to invest more in technology and grow their businesses.
Proponents also believe that demutualization will create a
fairer marketplace. The members who have traditionally run
the exchanges have been driven by the profits earned from
their own trading. The demutualized exchanges would in
theory be directed by shareholders and experienced
management teams who are more focused on the bottom line,138
which in a competitive environment would mean there would
be pressure to provide the best possible services.
There are concerns that demutualization creates new
conflicts of interest. One concern is that an inherent conflict
exists between the interests of the shareholders and the
market users.139 It has been suggested, for example, that a forprofit exchange would not rigorously undertake self-regulatory
obligations if those obligations negatively affect profitability.140
The issue is whether a commercial entity that is running an
exchange and seeking to protect and promote its business can
also support the integrity and efficiency of the trading markets
by setting and enforcing regulations that are in the public
interest.141
One must enter this debate with the understanding that
the current structure has its own conflicts. Even traditional,
not for profit exchanges are run by members interested in
rise in stock exchanges trading volume, global integration of the capital
markets and competition for trading profits have triggered a
disintermediation comparable to the unfixing of commission rates.
Decimalization has cut the conventional trading increment, formerly twelve
and a half cents, to a penny or less. Futures exchanges similarly have been
buffeted by technological change, global competition and resulting cost
pressures.
Id.
138

Robert Wilmouth, President of the National Futures Association, Remarks
at the IOSCO Conference (June 24, 2001), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/
news/mewstestimony.asp?articleID=287 (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
139
See Erickson, supra note 2, at 5.
140
Id at 5-6.
141
Karmel, supra note 1, at 420. But see Erickson, supra note 2, at 6 n.9:
[I]n a briefing of staff for the Senate Agriculture Committee, Robert Colby,
Deputy Director of the SEC’s Division of Market Regulation, raised the
converse argument. Would a demutualized exchange have a perverse
incentive to impose hefty fines for violative activity, thereby creating a profit
center for the exchange? While this view might be a short-term profit
maximization strategy, an exchange employing such a practice would quickly
lose business in a competitive market where similar products are traded on
many exchanges.
Id.
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making money and enhancing value through trading and seat
value.142 Furthermore, the current structure of exchange
disciplinary programs, where members sanction fellow
members, could arguably affect the rigor of an exchange’s selfregulatory program. Therefore, to some extent, questioning the
efficacy of a for-profit structure in fulfilling self-regulatory
obligations is also questioning the current exchange structure.
According to a CFTC report on demutualization that
was published by CFTC Commissioner Thomas Erickson in
2000, even if new conflicts arise under the for-profit context,
exchanges would continue to have a self-interest in preserving
their reputations for providing fair and efficient markets.143
Exchanges like the CME, the New York Stock Exchange
and the New York Mercantile Exchange aggressively market
their records of regulatory enforcement to attract new business,
and as more competitors enter the market place, the
reputations of these exchanges will pay a heavier price when
their regulatory systems fail.144 During a Senate hearing in
2000, Thomas Donovan, the chief executive of the CBOT, told
legislators that “the CFTC strictly should be an oversight
agency, one that provides the flexibility for us to use our self—
the regulatory structure as a marketing tool for people to want
to come and trade . . . .”145 At the same hearing, James McNulty,
the CEO of the CME, concurred, saying that the exchange has
built “a highly disciplined self-regulatory body in the CME, and
we think that is one of the reasons people come to work with
our exchange.”146
B.

Initial Reforms: Exchanges and Regulation Bodies React

One issue that exchanges have been forced to address is
the independence of boards of directors. A scandal over
governance at the New York Stock Exchange led regulators to
revisit issues surrounding exchanges’ governance standards.147
In September of 2003, NYSE Chairman and CEO Richard
142

Erickson, supra note 2, at 6.
Id.
144
Id.
145
Hearing Before S. Subcomm. on Research, Nutrition and General Legis.,
supra note 124, at 20.
146
Id. In the securities industry, the NYSE has a regulatory staff of 550
people and a budget of $142 million annually. The NASD has a regulatory staff of 2100
people and an annual budget of $500 million. See Cohen & Kelly, supra note 2.
147
See, e.g., Cohen & Kelly, supra note 2.
143
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Grasso was pressured to resign after it was made public that
he was entitled to close to $140 million in compensation and
deferred retirement benefits in 2003148 (the NYSE as a whole
made less than $28.1 million in profits in 2002).149 Much of the
focus since has centered on the structure of the board, and
claims that it did not receive enough information to gain a
sufficient understanding of the pay package it was approving.150
A review of the NYSE’s approach is relevant to the
study of futures exchanges because the futures industry has
historically followed the lead of the securities industry.151
Grasso, a 35-year veteran at the NYSE, had been a respected
figure in the debate over demutualization for both securities
and futures exchanges. In a hearing before the Senate Banking
Committee in September of 1999, Grasso said that the NYSE
would need to demutualize, and possibly go public, in order to
fend off competition from “electronic communications
networks,” commercially-owned electronic trading systems
known as ECNs.152 Grasso argued that ECNs are not subject to
cumbersome self-regulatory requirements, and are often owned
by wealthy corporations that are willing to invest money to
expand and enhance their businesses.153 Demutualization would
cause the members’ interests to align with the success of the
exchange as a whole, as opposed to being skewed toward the
success of only the floor trading operations.154 Under a for-profit
structure the NYSE would also be able to raise money by
148

Jake Keaveny & Brendan Intindola, NYSE Chairman Grasso Resigns
Under Pressure, REUTERS NEWS, Sept. 17, 2003. It was later determined that Grasso’s
total compensation, including compensation and deferred benefits, was closer to $190
million, when including an additional $50 million he claimed to be owed. Ben White,
Former NYSE Chairman Grasso Sued Over Pay, Washington Post, May 25, 2004.
149
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 42 (2002), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/2002ar_financial_review.pdf (last viewed Mar. 27, 2005).
150
Andrew Countryman, NYSE Chief Proposes Independent Board, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 6, 2003, at 1. New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, whose office has
jurisdiction over not-for-profit corporations like the NYSE, said his office “will probe
the role of NYSE board members and others that helped create” Grasso’s compensation
package.” Under New York not-for-profit laws directors can only approve compensation
packages to executives that are commensurate with the benefits that the executives
provide to the corporation. Jake Keaveny and Mark McSherry, Spitzer Says Troubled
by Report on Grasso Pay, REUTERS NEWS, Jan. 13, 2004.
151
See Karmel, supra note 1, at 402 (“To a large extent the CFTC is an
analogue to the SEC . . . .”).
152
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF THE U.S. STOCK MARKETS: HEARING BEFORE THE
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 106th Cong. 3-4 (Sept. 28,
1999) (statement of Richard A. Grasso, CEO, New York Stock Exchange) [herinafter
Grasso, Hearing]
153
Id.
154
Id.
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selling stock, either publicly or to private investors. Grasso also
argued that greater competition in the market place would
strengthen the NYSE’s commitment to regulation.155 At the
time he made that statement, the exchange had no intentions
of altering the compensation of its board—then made up of 50%
industry representatives and 50% public directors unaffiliated
with its members—as a way to eliminate conflicts.156
The public outcry surrounding Grasso’s ouster has since
led the 211-year old exchange to dramatically alter its course.
John Reed, the former co-CEO of Citigroup Inc. who was
brought in as interim NYSE chairman, orchestrated a series of
reforms.157 NYSE members approved a plan that the board be
cut down to 8 members, less than a third of its present size,
and not include any representatives of the financial firms that
are members of the exchange.158 Under the new structure, the
board is responsible for such issues as compensation,
independent audits, and self-regulation, while a separate
advisory committee that would include member firms would be
created to help oversee issues that are strategic to the
exchange’s business.159 The Securities and Exchange
Commission has approved the proposal.160
Such corporate governance initiatives are implemented
on securities markets sooner than on futures markets because
of the public nature of the companies that are listed on them.
The latest board proposal at the NYSE is an extension to a
similar shake-up some 31 years earlier. In 1972, significant
changes were made to the NYSE constitution after release of
the Martin Report, a congressionally commissioned study that

155

Id.
Id. at 5.
157
See Phyllis Plitch, Reed Keeps SRO Status, But Adds Independent Board,
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Nov. 5, 2003.
158
See Greg Farrell, Reed Proposes Cutting NYSE Board to Eight, USA
TODAY, Nov. 6, 2003. Several State treasurers and large public pension officials, some
of whom publicly pushed for Grasso’s ouster, felt that Reed’s plan was just more of the
status quo. Sean Harrigan, president of the nation’s largest public pension fund, the
$145 billion California Public Employee’s Retirement System, said “Investors were
expecting a home run proposal to reform the New York Stock Exchange. What we got . .
. is not even a base hit.” Arden Dale, Pension Funds See Flaws in NYSE Reform Plan,
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Nov. 5, 2003.
159
See Plitch, supra note 157.
160
Ken Hoover, SEC Approves NYSE’s Reform Proposals, But Critics Will
Press for More Change, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Dec. 18, 2003. While SEC
commissioners unanimously approved the proposals, “[SEC Chairman] William
Donaldson said further change may come as the SEC undertakes a broad review of
market self-regulation in 2004.” Id.
156
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was critical of the exchange.161 The report had recommended
that the NYSE reduce the number of board seats to twenty-one
from thirty-three, and that the number of members
representing the public be increased to ten from three.162 Prior
to the reforms half of the NYSE’s board had been composed of
public directors.
Traditionally, outside directors representing the public
had only a token representation on futures exchanges.163 In
1989, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ran an undercover
sting at the CME and CBOT that resulted in the indictment of
forty-eight individuals for various trading practice violations on
commodity exchange floors.164 The controversy surrounding the
arrests led Congress to amend the Commodity Futures Act in
1992, including a provision which had previously failed that
required at least 20% of the regular voting members of the
exchanges’ boards be independent, non-member directors.165
Other provisions required that a diversity of interests be
represented by including the principal groups of the
commodities being traded, floor brokers and at least 10% from
a group that included farmers, merchants, and exporters.166

161

See Karmel, supra note 1, at 405.
Id. at 405-06.
These changes occurred in the context of uncertainty about the immunity of
stock exchanges form the anti-trust laws, pressures to unfix commission rates
and the financial and operational back office crisis of the securities industry.
These developments ultimately led to the enactment of the 1975 Act that
restructured the regulatory relationship between the SEC and SROs and
stripped stock exchanges of some of their former autonomy. The Martin
Report was intended to compel the NYSE to discard what vestiges of a
private club atmosphere then remained and to become a quasi-public
organization.
Id. (citing House Subcomm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
Securities Industry Study, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Spec. Rep. 438, at 3-13, 131-46, 15568 (Aug. 25, 1972)). In 1971 the NYSE was incorporated, and initially the SEC had
some doubts about whether this would hurt its ability to be a self-regulator. See
Comments on NYSE Incorporation, Exchange Act Rel. No. 9112, 1971 WL 1717 (SEC)
(Mar. 17, 1971).
163
See Joseph Weber, Red Flags Rising at the Merc, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 20,
2003.
164
See Karmel, supra note 1, at 408 (citing JERRY W. MARKHAM,
COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION AND OTHER CLAIMS § 14.10 (1998)).
165
See id.
These criminal indictments were upheld, although the trials had mixed
results. In response to the sting operations Congress passed legislation to
strengthen trading in the pits . . . audit trails were strengthened, there was
increased regulation of floor broker associations, and more outsiders were
required to be included on exchange boards and disciplinary committees.
Id. at 408-09 (citing MARKHAM, supra note 164, at § 14.10).
166
Karmel, supra note 1, at 409.
162
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A major futures exchange to come under scrutiny
following the NYSE scandal was the CME.167 In 2000 the CME
was the first exchange to demutualize168 (preceding plans by the
CBOT and the New York Mercantile Exchange),169 and in 2002
it became the only major U.S. exchange to go public.170 In an
October, 2003 article, Business Week reporter Joseph Weber
questioned the independence of the CME’s board, and said that
the CFTC is scrutinizing its corporate governance policies.171 At
the time only four of the 105-year old exchange’s twenty
directors do not have ties to the CME or its trading floor, while
fifteen were long time exchange members.172
In November, 2003 the CME announced that it planned
to make a number of changes to its Board that would enhance
the independent oversight of key corporate governance issues.173
As part of the plan, the CME would create a new board level
committee in 2004, comprised solely of independent, nonmember directors.174 The committee would conduct an annual
review of issues that include the independence of the CME’s
regulatory functions from its business operations; the CME’s
compliance with its statutory self-regulatory responsibilities;
the funding of the CME’s self-regulatory responsibilities; and

167

Weber, supra note 163.
Chicago Mercantile Exchange to Dual List on Nasdaq Stock Market,
NASDAQ PRESS RELEASE, April 27, 2005, at http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/
pr2005/ne_section05_047.stm. See Erickson, supra note 2, at 4. At the time that the
CME demutualized is set in motion a two year plan to reduce its existing 39-member
board to 19 members, with the exchange run by a chief executive officer hired by the
board. Id.
169
Peter McKay, SEC Clears CBOT Reorganization, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15,
2005, at C4.
170
Chicago Merc Nets About $117.8 Million in IPO, REUTERS NEWS, Dec. 12,
2002.
171
Weber, supra note 163 (“The Merc board—including its compensation
committee—remains controlled by traders and floor brokers who are regulated by the
exchange. Indeed, the Merc [CME] seems rife with the same conflicts of interest that
tarnished the Big Board [NYSE] before CEO Richard A. Grasso self destructed.”).
172
Id.
173
Peter A. McKay, CME Alters Governance in Step That May Help Avert
Criticism, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2003, at C16.
Market-structure experts were quick to say the changes . . . are mild
compared with the plan put out by Big Board [NYSE] interim Chairman John
Reed. . . . Still, the plan will have some immediate results . . . trader William
R. Shepard, longtime chairman of the Merc’s compensation committee, will
leave that position. Also, the plan, which came out of the governance
committee now led by trader Jack Sandner, will require him to give up that
position.
Id.
174
Id.
168
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the compensation of exchange employees involved in regulatory
activities.175
By making its boards more independent, the NYSE and
the CME hope to preserve its regulatory roles from
encroachment by the government. Critics have suggested that
self-regulatory bodies should be completely separate from the
exchanges’ business operations.176 The NYSE has publicly
opposed suggestions that it should either spin its regulatory
unit off into a subsidiary, or that the industry should move
towards a single self-regulatory organization (SRO) for the
entire securities industry, such as the National Association of
Securities Dealers, a NYSE competitor.177 In the futures
industry, the National Futures Association (NFA) has
aggressively marketed itself as a third party provider of
regulatory services to other exchanges, though with limited
success.178
Regulatory authorities have been a step slower, but are
moving ahead with comprehensive groups of proposals. The
SEC, which saw nearly all of the major scandals of the last
several years come under its watch, has opened a series of
governance and regulatory related proposals for public
comment.179 Some of the proposals mimic those made by
securities industry. The SEC would call for securities
exchanges and registered securities associations to require a
majority of board members to be independent, and certain
board committees would be required to be composed solely of
independent directors.180 There would also be requirements that
a separation be maintained between regulatory functions and
175

Id.
See Karmel, supra note 1, at 424-26.
177
Grasso, Hearing, supra at note 152, at 3-4. “John Reed, the interim NYSE
chairman brought in after the Grasso uproar, is seeking to preserve self-regulation.”
Cohen & Kelly, supra note 2.
178
See Hearing Before Senate Subcomm. on Research, Nutrition and General
Legislation, supra note 124, 11 (statement of Robert Wilmouth, Chief Executive, NFA).
From 1977 to 1999 there were no new futures exchanges formed. In the last
six months, at least six different enterprises have stated their interest in
creating new electronic futures exchanges. All of them are dedicated to using
effective self-regulation . . . but none . . . are really shackled by the past.
Everyone is looking for more efficient ways to perform their self-regulatory
functions, and everyone has contracted NFA to discuss outsourcing that
function to us.
Id. at 12.
179
Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 70
Fed. Reg. 11 (Proposed Jan. 8, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. at pt. 240, 242, and
249) [hereinafter Fair Administration and Governance].
180
Id.
176
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market operations, and that funds brought in from regulatory
fines, fees and penalties be used for regulatory purposes.181
Further, the proposals would prohibit members that are
brokers or dealers from owning or voting more than 20% of the
ownership interest in the exchange.182 Among other proposals,
the SEC would require exchanges to maintain their books and
records in the U.S. and add reporting requirements by the
exchanges to enhance transparency.183 Exchanges that go
public, and whose shares trade on their own exchange, would
have a separate group of requirements to help supervise
trading and enforce listing standards.184
For its part, CFTC Chairman James Newsome opened a
review of self-regulation in May of 2003.185 The review revolves
around an analysis of regulation under the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act.186 As of April, 2003, it had opened a formal
request for commentary from futures market participants that
includes: board composition, regulatory structure, forms of
ownership of the exchanges, the structure of disciplinary
committees, and other issues.187
C.

Potential Alternatives: the NFA model and Market
Competition

The nature of the SRO structure makes the potential for
conflicts almost inherent. Under the 1934 Commodities
Exchange Act, SROs are required to act as quasi-governmental
bodies in implementing federal laws as their own. Yet SROs
are also membership organizations that represent the economic
interests of their partners.188 In addition, SROs are
marketplaces concerned with preserving and enhancing their
competitive positions.189 As competition grows among
marketplaces and SROs, it seems that the relationship that
SROs have with their members inevitably will strain the SROs’
ability to carry out their regulatory duties impartially.190
181

Id.
Id.
183
Id.
184
Fair Administration and Governance, supra note 179.
185
Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Governance of Self-Regulatory
Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg. 111 (request for comments made June 9, 2004).
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
See WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 8-9.
189
See id. at 9.
190
See id.
182
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In a recently updated study, the Securities Industry
Association (SIA), an industry group, evaluated six potential
models for self-regulation.191 In evaluating the models the SIA
echoed the original argument that the SRO model puts
regulatory decisions in the hands of people familiar with the
relevant facts, and that any regulatory change should not
abandon the system in favor of a distant, generalist regulator
that is not as deeply familiar with the markets it regulates.192
The study outlined a series of possible alternative structures
that include the splitting off of SRO functions into subsidiaries
of the exchanges; creation of a single SRO to audit and monitor
all broker dealers; or putting all of the regulatory responsibility
into the hands of the SEC (or CFTC).193
Proponents of a single SRO system argue that the
transition could be made relatively easily in the futures
industry because the NFA has already been sanctioned by, and
works closely with, the CFTC.194 The NFA, which is similar to
the National Association of Securities Dealers in the securities
industry, began as a regulator for trading participants that
were not registered with exchanges, but has moved into the
business of outsourcing its regulation services. The NFA can
avoid some of the criticisms arising from the demutualization
of SROs because it is a non-profit organization.195 Its board is
made up of representatives from the industry, though it is not
controlled by any one entity.196
The economic inefficiencies that come with operating
multiple SROs could also help to promote a single SRO system.
The NFA has marketed itself as an outsourcing facility for selfregulatory functions.197 By regulating numerous exchanges, the
NRA (or another comparable outsourcer to enter the market)

191

See generally id.
Id. at 6.
See WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 2-12.
194
Id.
195
See Natasha de Teran, Eurex Signs Up National Futures Association for
US Exchange, FIN. NEWS, Nov. 6, 2003. Rudolf Ferscha, Eurex CEO, said of an
agreement to farm out is regulatory services to NFA: “We have agreed on initial plans
of a three-year contract, with automatic one-year renewal contracts thereafter. The
NFA will ensure that Eurex US’s customers are protected at all times, and that
business will be fair, orderly and transparent.” Id.
196
See Board of Directors at the National Futures Association website, at
http://www.nfa.futures.org/aboutnfa/board.asp.
197
See Hearing Before Senate Subcomm. on Research, Nutrition and General
Legislature, supra note 124, at 11 (statement of Robert Wilmouth, Chief Executive,
NFA).
192
193
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would benefit from efficiencies of scale.198 Several newer
exchanges have contracted the NFA in hopes of finding a cost
effective means to regulate their trading operations. If pressure
on expenditures continues then traditional exchanges like the
CBOT and the CME could be pressured to reduce regulatory
expenditures,199 which in turn could diminish the quality of
regulation. Traditional exchanges are already being squeezed
by the trend towards lower trading fees. However, the NFA’s
outsourcing model is not free of potential conflicts either. As
the practice becomes more prevalent, issues could be raised
regarding the exchange’s continuing responsibility over its
contractor and the relationship of both entities to the
overseeing government regulator.200
The NFA entered into an agreement with Merchants
Exchange and BrokerTech, two small U.S. futures exchanges,
to perform market surveillance, conduct background checks,
investigate and litigate disciplinary matters, and perform
audits and financial surveillance.201 This led to a break through
deal that could give the NFA new credibility as a third party
regulator. In November of 2003, it signed a three-year contract
with Eurex US, the U.S. arm of Eurex, to be its regulator.202
Frankfurt-based Eurex, which in recent years surpassed the
CBOT as the world’s largest futures exchange in terms of
volume traded, received approval form the CFTC to set up a
U.S. exchange in 2004.203
Detractors of the single SRO model say that it would
weaken self-regulation. Broker-dealer regulation has its roots
in efforts to assure creditworthiness of exchange members.204 In
that regard, the big exchanges have spent hundreds of millions
of dollars setting up self-regulatory systems to stand behind
assurances that large member firms are financially viable.205 A
198

Id.
Id.
See Int’l Org. of Sec. Communications Technical Comm., Discussion Paper
on Stock Exchange Demutualization, at 8 (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.iosco.
org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD112.pdf.
201
Ros Krasny, Eurex US in Deal With Regulatory Services Provider, REUTERS
NEWS, Nov. 5, 2003.
202
Jeremy Grant, Eurex US Unveils Governance Structure, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
6, 2003.
203
Eurex US Launch Date Moved to Feb 8 Pending CFTC Approval, MARKET
NEWS INT’L, Jan. 28, 2004.
204
See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 86.
205
See Cohen & Kelly, supra note 2. In the securities industry, the NYSE has
a regulatory staff of 550 people and a budget of $142 million annually. The NASD has a
regulatory staff of 2,100 people and an annual budget of $500 million.
199
200
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single SRO based in a separate location from the exchange and
indirectly run by the CFTC or SEC may never be able to attain
the same level of intimacy with a particular exchange. Not
surprisingly, major exchanges like the NYSE, the CME and the
CBOT have sought to preserve their regulatory duties by
publicly opposing a single SRO model.206
Ultimately, competition in the market place may dictate
the future model. If choice and competition are important in
how financial products are offered, perhaps there are analogous
benefits in terms of how exchanges are self-regulated.207 Just as
the NFA has offered its services as third party regulator, the
CME or CBOT also may decide to compete by also farming out
their regulatory services.208 Thomas Erickson, the former CFTC
commissioner, indicated there is talk that the CME has studied
such an initiative. The NASD has taken similar initiatives in
the securities business, and could also work toward offering a
similar service to futures exchanges, according to Erickson.209
Such a scenario opens up the specter of further conflicts. For
instance, the CME could create a structure where it acted as
regulator to itself and a competitor. A third party SRO could be
acquired by a large financial firm like Citigroup Inc. or J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co., which also operate FCMs. Will the
quality of self-regulation diminish amid the pressure to cut
costs?210
Competitive forces among futures exchanges may also
give way to new incentives to uphold regulatory standards.211
206

See House Subcomm. Hearing on General Farm Commodities and Risk
Management, supra note 125, at 61. (statement of Terrence A. Duffy, Chairman
Chicago Mercantile Exchange) (“Rather than detracting from our ability as a self
regulator, the CME’s incentives and capability to maintain an effective program of selfregulation have been enhanced by its reorganization as a for-profit company.”).
207
See Erickson, supra note 2, at 8. Moreover, to require exchanges to contract
with a super self-regulator would appear to be inconsistent with the CFTC’s role as an
oversight agency, especially if regulatory concerns do not outweigh the benefits of the
current SRO structure. Id.
208
Telephone interview with Thomas Erickson, former CFTC Commissioner
and Vice-President, Bunge Ltd., Washington, D.C. (Nov. 7, 2003).
209
Id. The NASD has been pushing for a single SRO model and the former
Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, briefly embraced this model. See Jeffrey E.
Garten, Manager’s Journal: How to Keep NYSE’s Stock High, WALL ST. J. Sept. 13,
1999, at A44. The main barrier has been that the NYSE opposes the single SRO model.
Grasso, Hearing, supra note 152.
210
Telephone interview with Thomas Erickson, former CFTC Commissioner
and Vice-President, Bunge Ltd., Washington, D.C. (Nov. 7, 2003).
211
Karmel, supra note 1, at 370.
An interesting and relevant question is whether current trading technologies
and the competition these technologies have engendered should lead to a
reduction of SEC market regulation, rather than increase in regulation
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Currently, exchanges like the CBOT and CME say that the
integrity of their market place is the biggest incentive to
uphold such standards. But that argument has weaknesses
because for many futures products those exchanges offer the
only liquid markets for particular contracts, and thus they
enjoy de facto monopolies.212 If, for instance, the Eurex’s U.S.
exchange gains market share, and also offers a more
transparent, and fair trading operation, then regulation issues
could become more prevalent in traders’ decisions over where
they do business. In at least one instance, competitive
pressures have already had an impact. In 2003 the SEC issued
a report that said the American Stock Exchange had massive
shortcomings in its regulation of options trading and that it
had attempted to cover up its deficiencies.213 In October of 2003
board members from the NASD, which holds a majority stake
in the American Stock Exchange, and the American Stock
Exchange voted to have the NASD take over its selfregulation.214 In making the decision, the directors at both
boards considered the American Stock Exchange’s poor
performance in the regulatory arena and the high cost of
regulation.215
IV.

CONCLUSION

Critics have questioned the SROs’ ability to maintain
fair and transparent trading, but as this Note has
demonstrated, failures in government oversight have also been
pervasive. It seems unlikely that the government could operate
more efficiently as a sole regulator.216 If pure government
envisioned by current SEC concept and rulemaking releases, so that
competition rather than regulation can determine outcomes.
Id. at 369-70.
212
Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The
Case of Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141, 154 (1995) (“As the advocates of
self-regulation suggest, competition from other exchanges could mitigate, and perhaps
eliminate, these problems. Unfortunately, it is by no means clear that competition
between exchanges in a particular contract is especially acute.”).
213
Jed Horowitz et al., SEC Says Amex Had ‘Serious Failure’ in Enforcing
Regulations, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 29, 2003.
214
Jenny Anderson, NASD May Take Over Regulation of Exchange, N.Y.
POST, Oct. 21, 2003, at 31.
215
Id.
216
Markham, supra note 9, at 405.
[W]e must be careful of what we wish for in life. A single regulator may also
seek to expand its powers after a scandal. A single regulator will also
undoubtedly use bad judgment in times of crisis. A single regulator could also
stifle competition, over-regulate, and cause a loss of competitive position in
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regulation were a preferable alternative, the system of selfregulation would have been scrapped years ago amid the
government’s many trials and errors.217 The SRO system is
preferable to a pure government regulatory scheme because it
defrays much of the costs onto the market users, and makes
efficient use of the expertise at the exchanges.
The role and duties of SROs vis a vis government regulation
has steadily evolved since adoption of the Commodity
Exchange Act and the Securities Exchange Act, with the
government approving legislation throughout the years to
increase its oversight authority and impose stricter standards.
While the government initially sought to micro-manage
regulation at the exchanges, it more recently determined that
giving SROs more autonomy is more effective.
Thomas Erickson, who spoke regularly about the future
of SROs during his tenure as a CFTC Commissioner, said in an
interview that from a political standpoint the SRO system has
too much history to ever be scrapped altogether.218 There will be
conflicts of interest in any system, and so the challenge is to
create a system with the right oversight and incentives so that
as many conflicts as possible are eliminated.219 In that regard,
self-regulation is a preferable system to pure government
regulation, and the question becomes one of balance.
The CFTC should take several steps to eliminate the
specter of conflicts of interest within exchanges. It should
implement a model for independent boards similar to that
adopted by the NYSE, or the rules that the SEC has proposed.
These rules would ensure that exchange members are
separated from regulation related decisions. Secondly, the
CFTC should facilitate competition in the marketplace to the
extent possible. For example, the Eurex’s entrance into the
U.S. could spark the beginning of a period of a competition
driven regulation market, where market participants
themselves go far in determining what the most effective SROs,
international markets. It could even try to become a Japanese MoF [Ministry
of Finance] that seeks to manage the economy by bureaucratic fiat.
Id.
217

Karmel, supra note 1, at 401. The 1975 Act sought to preserve and
reinforce the concept of industry self-regulation. Id.
218
Telephone interview with Thomas Erickson, former CFTC Commissioner
and Vice-President, Bunge Ltd., Washington, D.C. (Nov. 7, 2003). Self-regulation is so
enshrined in U.S. securities regulation that it is unlikely and probably not in the public
interest for it to be supplanted by government regulation. Karmel, supra note 1, at 427.
219
Id.
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or self-regulatory model, will be. Finally, the CFTC needs to
establish a formal structure that facilitates regular dialogue
with exchanges and other market participants. The resulting
effects of demutualization, electronic trading, and the
globalization of marketplaces have yet to be fully realized. In
this way, the CFTC would be able to react in a steady and
effective manner to conflicts or other issues that arise from
demutualization and other forces in the marketplace.
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